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pretation of the statute which avoids serious constitutional doubts is
that which requires receipt, possession and/or transporataion to be
shown to have been "in commerce or affecting commerce."' 78 Therefore,
in the face of casting serious constitutional doubts upon the entire
statute, the court reversed petitioner's conviction. 7 9
Since the powers of Congress are confined to those expressed in
article I of the Constitution as limited by the tenth amendment, it
would appear that state gun-control regulations would face fewer
constitutional barriers save any restrictive provisions in the individual
state constitutions. Despite this, their effectiveness in stopping firearms
proliferation is often nil because of the non-uniformity of legislation
from state to state. 8 0
Clearly what is needed is pervasive legislation which by including
substantial due process safeguards would serve the dual function of
protecting society at large without infringing upon the rights of legiti-
mate shooters to own and use firearms.' 8 '
CPLR 301
AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
In one of only three en banc hearings during the 1970 term, the
court of appeals in Scanapico v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac
R.R.182 stated that its prior panel decision 83 upholding personal juris-
178 United States v. Bass, 434 F.2d 1296, 1300-01 (2d Cir. 1970).
179 Id.
180 Except for Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey, Rhode Island and Utah, 44 of
the 50 states have passed statutes making it possible for residents to purchase rifles and
shotguns from federally licensed dealers in adjacent states. Under the 1968 Federal
Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq. (1968), enactment of such statutes allows resi-
dents to purchase firearms outside of their home states. Now, residents can "shop next
door." For example, Missouri touches no fewer than eight other states. See AzmucN
RiFLEMAN, Sept. 1971, at 23.
181 See Benenson, A Controlled Look at Gun Controls, 14 N.Y.L.F. 718 (1968), where
a possible solution is presented. A procedure would be established whereby one would
voluntarily apply for a United States Firearms Identity Card. The only reasons for
refusal would be a recent conviction for a violent crime, confinement for alcoholism,
narcotics addiction, or mental defects. There would be a provision for persons who had
recovered from a restrictive disability to present evidence to that fact. Any denial of
a card would be appealable to a board consisting of firearms experts, police, and
ordinary citizens. A denial by this board would finally be appealable to the federal
district court. All card holders would be then permitted to buy firearms anywhere as
long as local laws were not thus violated. Also, there would be a specific provision which
would invite the states to require that every gun owner in the state acquire the federal
identity card. This proposed law would be a good start in establishing a uniform national
system of screening gun owners and is a logical compromise, in the best of American
political traditions, between opposing factions.
182 439 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1970).
183 The initial appeal was decided on July 16, 1970 before Circuit Judges Lumbard
and Hays and District Judge Blumenfeld. The rehearing by the court en banc was de-
cided December 18, 1970 in an opinion by Chief Judge Friendly.
SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE
diction over the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad
(R.F&P.) did not practically subject every major railroad to such
jurisdiction "in any state where it engaged in freight solicitation."'18 4
This was a tort action of a passenger enroute to New York from
Florida. The injury to the plaintiff resulted from a falling suitcase while
the train was travelling over the defendant's tracks between Richmond
and Washington. In the panel decision, the court held that R.F&P.
maintained sufficient "minimum contacts" in compliance with the due
process requirement to subject it to personal jurisdiction within New
York. 8 5 These activities included freight solicitation by two employees,
one being a New York resident; sale and issuance by connecting carriers
of coupon tickets and through bills of lading covering carriage over
R.F.P.'s tracks, for which R.F.&:P. received compensation; and the
continuing presence of the defendant's freight cars in interstate trains
operated by connecting railroads. 8 6 In a strong dissent, Judge Lumbard
postulated that the latter two criteria would apply equally well to
virtually every railroad. 87 He concluded that the majority's basis for
jurisdiction rested on the activity of one resident solicitor of freight
business. 8 However, the reconsideration established that the holding
was not so broad. 80
Judge Friendly's opinion for the court en banc is devoted primarily
to the issue of whether there was an unreasonable burden on interstate
commerce.9 0 This doctrine had its genesis in Davis v. Farmers' Co-
operative Equity Co.191 where the Court considered four factors in
184 439 F.2d at 25.
185 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The test laid down by
the court is a flexible one of balancing the interests and hardships of the parties. It is
basically a policy of fairness designed to foster "fair play and substantial justice." The
doctrine was extended to its broadest limits in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355
U.S. 220 (1957), where the Court held that an out-of-state insurance company was sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the resident state of the policy holder. The traditional interpre.
tation of McGee has been that a corporation will be subject to process in the state where
the cause of action arises. See F. JAuEs, CIvIL PaocEDuRE 642 (2d ed. 1965). Cf. N.Y. Crv.
PFtAc. § 302 (McKinney Supp. 1971). But in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), the
Court stated that the trend toward liberalizing the requirements for personal jurisdiction
as reflected in International Shoe does not "[herald] the eventual demise of all restrictions
on personal jurisdiction of state courts." 357 US. at 251. Thus, the constitutional require-
ments of due process "are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or
distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the
respective States." Id.
186 439 F.2d at 19.
187 Id. at 21. (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
188 Id. at 25. (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
189 Id.
190 This was probably in response to the appellant's arguments before the court
which emphasized this aspect of the case.
191 262 US. 312 (1923). There are only six other Supreme Court cases on this doctrine.
International Milling Co. v. Columbia Transp. Co., 292 US. 511 (1934); Denver & R.G.W.
1972]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
determining that there was an unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce. First, the cause of action did not arise in Minnesota (the
forum state); second, the transaction giving rise to the action was not
entered into in Minnesota; third, the carrier did not own or operate a
railroad in Minnesota; and fourth, the plaintiff was not a resident.192
The last criterion was termed "a fact of high significance" by Mr.
Justice Cardozo in International Milling Co. v. Columbia Transporta-
tion Co.t93 The court of appeals in Scanapico relied on this statement
and rejected the defendant's contention that International Milling
should be limited to its facts. 94 Thus, the plaintiff's New York residence
was a prime factor in defeating the appellant's commerce clause argu-
ment.
The court made it clear that the due process requirements were met
since R.F.&P.'s operation of through trains established "a peculiarly
intimate relation with New York."' 95 The sale of coupon tickets on these
through trains along with the other factors mentioned by the majority
in the panel decision were also given weight in the concluson that there
was sufficient evidence of corporate presence to constitutionally permit
jurisdiction.
Finally, the court reached the issue of whether jurisdiction had
been established under New York law.196 It held that the sale of tickets
for the through trains along with R.F.&P.'s freight solicitation brought
it within the scope of New York's CPLR § 301.19 as applied in the
state1 98 and federal courts in New York.199
R.R. v. Terte, 284 U.S. 284 (1932); Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Mix, 278 U.S. 492 (1929);
Hoffman v. Missouri ex rel. Foraker, 274 U.S. 21 (1927); Missouri ex reL. St. Louis, B. & M.
Ry. v. Taylor, 266 U.S. 200 (1924); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Wells, 265 U.S. 101 (1924).
192 262 U.S. at 317. From this set of facts one might be tempted to ask why the
commerce clause issue was raised at all since apparently there was no basis for jurisdiction
under the due process clause. A possible answer might be found in Michigan Cent. R.R.
v. Mix, 278 U.S. 492 (1929), where the Court, referring to Davis, stated: "It was assumed
that the carrier had been found within the State." Id. at 496.
193292 US. 511, 520 (1934).
194 In International Milling, the jurisdiction was based upon the attachment of a
steamship which was delivering cargo at a Minnesota port. It was conceded that, although
the plaintiff's residence was extremely important, it was not controlling in itself. id. at
519. Therefore, Mr. Justice Cardozo had occasion to recognize that the defendant "does
not do business like a railroad company along a changeless route." Id. at 520. But this
element was offset by the fact that the vessel was within the jurisdiction pursuant to
direct commercial activity and not for some incidental or collateral purpose. Thus the
distinction the appellant apparently attempted to make clearly has no basis. If anything,
it weakens his position. Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960);
F. JAMES, CIVIL PRocEDuRE 654 (2d. Ed. 1965).
195 439 F.2d at 27.
196 See Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 225 (2d Cir 1963), overruling
197 See generally 1 J. WExNsrEN, H. KoRN & A. MILLER, NEW YoRK CIVIL PRaCarCa
§ 801, at 3-2 et seq. (1969).
198 Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 19 N.Y. 2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851, 281 N.Y.S.2d
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An analysis of the opinion indicates that there was little doubt that
the defendant "purposefully [availed] itself of the privilege of conduct-
ing activities . . . ,,200 within New York. The only other issue was
whether there was an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.
Unfortunately, the court merged the two issues and stated that since the
higher standards of the commerce clause were satisfied by the elements
discussed, "they satisfied a fortiori the requirements of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."20 1 Unless the court meant to
imply a real break with precedent,202 this is a non sequitur.203 Thus, the
opinion is better read by ignoring such an analogy.204
41 cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967).
109 Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 385 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 996 (1968).
200 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). This is precisely what the dissent
did not find. 439 F.2d at 22.
201 439 F.2d at 28.
202 See note 185 supra.
203 The commerce clause, unlike the due process clause, is a device, not unlike forum
non conveniens, to annul jurisdiction that has already attached. See Farrier, Suits Against
Foreign Corporations as a Burden on Interstate Commerce, 17 MINN. L. REv. 381, 390
(1933); See also F. JAMES, CIvIL PROCEDURE 661 (2d ed. 1965). See also I J. WEINSTEIN, H.
KORN 8: A. MILLER, NEw YORK CIVIL PRACTICE § 301.07, at 3-11 (1969). An analysis of the
cases shows that this is the most logical view. International Milling Co. v. Columbia
Transp. Co., 292 U.S. 511 (1934); Missouri ex rel. St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. v. Taylor, 266
U.S. 200 (1924); and Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Wells, 265 U.S. 101 (1924), all involved
jurisdiction based on the attachment of property within the forum state. Clearly, the
state courts could constitutionally assert jurisdiction. But that jurisdiction, although
legitimately attached, was declared void by the enforcement of the constitutional right
that interstate commerce not be unreasonably burdened. The jurisdiction was not void
ab initio. Rather, it was voidable. The same reasoning applies to in personam jurisdiction.
In Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Mix, 278 U.S. 492 (1929), the plaintiff contended that the
defendant railroad had made a general appearance under the state law. The Court ad-
mitted that due process was satisfied on the strength of York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890).
It stated, however, that the constitutional claim of the commerce clause cannot be defeated
by a local rule of practice. Clearly, if the commerce clause is a limitation upon jurisdiction
differing only in degree from the due process clause, the Court could not have made
such a statement without further explanation. There are also practical objections to
equating, in kind, the commerce clause to the due process clause. Principally, it would
afford ground for collateral attack, opening an avenue for needless litigation. See Foster,
Place of Trial in Civil Actions, 43 HARv. L. REv. 1217, 1232-39 (1930).
204 However, if the court means what it says, i.e., that the test of commerce clause
differs only in degree from the test of the due process clause, then the plaintiff's residence
has been given a meaning beyond any heretofore given by the Supreme Court. See note
185 supra.
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